Accident Investigation Report

Dude Fire Incident
Multiple Firefighter Fatality

June 26, 1990
Southwestern Region
Tonto National Forest
NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE, FS CUSTODIAN OF ACCIDENT REPORT

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ELDON W. ROSS
Chief Investigator

JUL 20 1990

Team Members:

Jerry Monesmith, Fire Operations, Safety and Training
Washington Office

Hank Walters, Regional Safety and Health Manager
Intermountain Region

Frank Quintana, Regional Safety and Health Manager
Southwestern Region

Arvin White, Director, Fiscal and Public Safety
Southwestern Region

Dick Mangan, Program Leader, Fire, Aviation and Safety
Missoula Technology Development Center

Ted Putnam, Equipment Specialist
Missoula Technology Development Center

Patricia Andrews, Fire Behavior Specialist
Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station

Lee Redding, Staff Officer, Recreation and Wilderness
Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest

David Goens, Fire Weather Program Manager
National Weather Service

NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE, FS CUSTODIAN OF ACCIDENT REPORT
I. INVESTIGATION

A. Narrative

B. Findings

C. Causal Factors
A. Narrative

At approximately 1845 hours MST, Tuesday, June 26, 1990, the Washington Office Safety and Health Manager advised the Chief Investigator that a Chief's Office Accident Investigation Team was being formed to investigate a multiple fatality accident that had occurred on the Dude Fire, Tonto National Forest, Payson Ranger District.

Frank Quintana and Arvin White, Team Members from the Southwestern Regional Office, arrived at the Payson Ranger District late Tuesday evening for initial briefings, to secure the site and collect initial information. Ross, Monesmith, Quintana, White, Redding, and Walters met for the initial team meeting in the Payson Ranger District Office at 1230 hours, June 27 and received a briefing on the fire and events surrounding the accident from Bob Wagenfahr, Fire Staff Officer, Tonto NF, and Forrest Carpenter, Deputy Regional Forester.

It was determined immediately that fire behavior expertise would be required and Patricia Andrews, Fire Behavior expert was ordered for the team. Later, permission was requested and granted for David Goens, Meteorologist to join the team. Ron Zuniga, Assistant Director, Inspections and Investigations, Arizona Department of Corrections was granted permission to accompany the team during their investigation. Cliff Pearlberg, Arizona Natural Resources Manager, was also granted permission to observe the team functions.

The initial accident site visit was made on Wednesday, June 27, from 1730-2000 hours by all the team members except Mangan, Putnam, Andrews, and Goens who joined the team later. The second team meeting was held from 2030 to 2300 hours to organize and make team assignments for development of the necessary supporting data. Data responsibilities were as follows: Monesmith, Sequence of Events; Walters, Site Investigation; Quintana, Witness Statements; White, Records; and Andrews, Fire Behavior. Interview assignments were made to various team members.

The decision was made to use the Payson Ranger District Office as the Team Headquarters for June 28-29, then move to the Tonto Supervisor's Office in Phoenix for the remainder of the investigation. On Thursday, June 28, 0700 hours the team reassembled to review assignments, then separated to accomplish their individually assigned tasks. The entire team did not reassemble until June 30, however telephone contact was maintained to share important information or make additional assignments.

Bodies of the accident victims were photographed and removed by the County Sheriff’s Department. Collection of equipment, materials and information related to the accident victims was coordinated through the Arizona Department of Corrections. Ron Zuniga provided excellent support and assistance throughout the investigation. Activities at the accident scene and in the fire camp were coordinated with the Incident Commander. Support needs at Payson were coordinated with the District Ranger or his Staff Officers. The decision to relocate the investigation team headquarters to the Tonto Supervisor's Office was made in order to minimize the impact on already strained resources at the Payson Ranger District.

Interviews were conducted with key members of the overhead teams and all surviving members of the Perryville Crew. Statements or records were obtained from several other key persons knowledgeable of the incident, including representatives of the Gila County Sheriff’s Department and the Gila County Medical examiner.

The accident scene was released to the Incident Commander at approximately 1700 hours, June 30, 1990.

The close out for the Regional Forester, Forest Supervisor and their invited staffs was held July 5, 0830 to 1030 hours in Phoenix. Also attending was M. Jean Hassell, Arizona State Land Commissioner, Robert Rich, Chief Meteorological Services Division, National Weather Service (NWS) Western Region, and Walt Shaw, Type I Incident Management Team, Incident Commander.
Equipment and personal belongings of some of the Crew members collected at the accident site or other items belonging to the State were returned to the Department of Corrections.

The Chief Investigator released all the team members to their normal duties at 1000 hours, July 5, 1990, except Frank Quintana who was retained to come to the Washington Office to assist the National Safety and Health Manager in organizing the Chief's Board of Review.
B. Findings

The findings listed in this report are supported by Interviews, Witness Statements, Physical Evidence, Standard Forest Service Forms and other information which are held in our system of records.

Section

(a) Incident Management

(b) Personnel

(c) Equipment

(d) Weather

(e) Fire Behavior
(a) Incident Management

(1) The fire was lightning caused at approximately 1230 hours June 25 and it was reported at 1315 hours.

(2) A Type II Incident Management Team was ordered at 1500 hours on June 25.

(3) A National Type I Incident Management Team was ordered at 2105 hours on June 25.

(4) Records show the qualifications of the Type I and II Overhead Teams were appropriate for assigned duties.

(5) The Tonto Fire Net used by the Type II Team had heavy use, making communication difficult.

(6) The use of multiple undesignated frequencies resulted in the lack of communication between line personnel and overhead.

(7) The Shift plan safety message and fire behavior forecast accurately predicted the potential for extreme fire behavior and thunderstorm buildup.

(8) The Type I Team planned to "shadow" the Type II from 0600 to 1300 hours, and take over the incident at 1300 hours.

(9) Type I Operations Section Chief Cooke met with Type II Team Operations Chief VanTilborg at approximately 1200 hours on June 26 to discuss transition.

(10) Operations Chief Cooke assigned Division Supervisor Whitney responsibility for Bonita Creek subdivision protection and Division Supervisor Gatewood responsibility for Division "E" (Control Road to Road 144) at approximately 1250 hours on June 26.

(11) Division Supervisor Gatewood did not understand he had responsibility for the segment of Division "E" where Navajo Crew No. 2 and Perryville crews were working.

(12) The strategy was to construct and hold a line down the bottom of Walk Moore Canyon.

(13) Escape routes were discussed and understood; however, safety zones were not designated or developed prior to the entrapment.

(14) The Perryville Crew posted lookouts intermittently; none were out immediately prior to the entrapment.

(15) Burnout operations were conducted during the heat of the day and during predicted thunderstorm activity.

(b) Personnel

(1) Of the nineteen (19) Perryville Crew members, in 1990 Step testing, four scored 45 or above, six did not score 45 or above, and nine did not take the test. Two of the fatalities had passed the step test in 1989 or 1990.

(2) The Perryville Crew Representative was a qualified Strike Team Leader/Task Force Leader and is in training for Division Supervisor.
(3) The Perryville Crew personnel and Type II Overhead were in working or duty status in excess of 30 hours prior to the entrapment.

(4) The Perryville Crew had received training in shelter deployment.

(5) Eleven members of the Perryville Crew were entrapped. Six fatalities occurred: 5 males, 1 female. Of the five who survived the entrapment, one received critical burns, one serious burns, and three minor burns.

(6) Blood gas carbon monoxide levels of the fatalities ranged from less than 3% to a maximum of 28.5%.

(c) Equipment

(1) The Perryville Crew was properly equipped for fire line duty with personal protective equipment.

(2) The fire shelters were produced under contract to the General Services Administration using Forest Service specifications.

(3) Personal Protective Equipment functioned within design limits.

(4) Not all personnel had sufficient time to use Personal Protective Equipment in the recommended manner.

(5) Equipment near the victims indicate temperatures close to the ground were within survivable limits.

(6) Clothing degradation of four of the deceased indicates they were caught in a flame front prior to fully deploying fire shelters.

(7) Fire shelters of the deceased were opened, but were not held down in the recommended position throughout the hazardous period.

(d) Weather, June 26, 1990

(1) Record high temperatures in the mid 90’s, with 10%-15% humidities, were forecast and observed in the Dude Fire area.

(2) A convective cell occurred over the fire before 1000 hours.

(3) An updated fire weather forecast indicating building thunderstorm activity was obtained from the National Weather Service at 1100 hours. This information was not transmitted to fireline personnel.

(4) A National Weather Service Fire Weather Forecaster was requested and arrived at the Incident Base Camp at 1200 hours.

(5) A few sprinkles of rain occurred in the fire area around 1310-1315 hours.

(6) Designated weather observers were not assigned.

(7) A definite calm occurred a few minutes before the blow-up.

(8) The sky darkened a few minutes before the blow-up.

(9) A strong blast of wind preceded the fire front.
(10) A thunderstorm gust front moved over the entrapment site at 1410-1420 hours.

(11) A transcription error resulted in the Spot Weather Report in the day shift plan not accurately reflecting the National Weather Service spot weather forecast.

(e) Fire Behavior

(1) Torching, spotting, and short runs through the crowns occurred periodically from ignition through 1400 hours on June 26.

(2) Fuels were dry. Moisture contents of one-quarter inch sticks (10 hour) were 4%; large dead logs (1000 hour) 8%; live fuel (manzanita, scrub oak, and silver tassel leaves) 76%.

(3) The fire burned through ponderosa pine, manzanita, scrub oak, needle and leaf litter, and large dead and down fuel.

(4) Heavy dead and down fuels (logs) were completely consumed by the fire because of the dry conditions, contributing to development of the convection column.

(5) Short range spotting resulted from the burnout operations (1100-1315 hours).

(6) The weather (wind) totally dominated the fire environment at the time of the blow-up.

(7) The fire flashed from the west to the east side of Walk Moore Canyon. This was followed immediately by the burning of the surface fuels.

(8) The fire spread approximately 1.5 miles during the first one-half hour of the strong wind event. The fire crossed Walk Moore Canyon during this time.

(9) The fire spread and intensity were within the range of control by handcrews from 0500 until 1400 hours.
C. Causal Factors

(a) Critical weather and fire behavior conditions were predicted and observed by some, but not acted upon by Incident personnel.

(b) The fire enhanced the convection column to the point that the column collapsed causing the down rush of winds in a radial manner. This resulted in rapid fire spread on nearly all sides of the fire.

(c) Poor radio communications and differences in frequencies caused a break down in communications between overhead and crews, and between ground personnel and air operations.

(d) Transition of the overhead teams during mid-shift resulted in an uncertainty as to Division Supervisory responsibility for the Navajo Crew No. II and Perryville crews in Walk Moore Canyon.

(e) Eight of the eighteen “Situations that Shout Watch Out” (Nos. 3 6 7 8 11 12 14 16) were not recognized, and actions consistent with seven of the ten “Standard Fire Orders” (Nos. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8) were not taken.

(f) The fire spread so fast that the victims, without warning, did not have sufficient time to escape.
II. SUPPORTING DATA

A. Sequence of Events

B. Site Investigation

C. Witness Statements

D. Records
A. Sequence of Events

At approximately 1230 hours, June 25, 1990, a dry lightning storm started a fire under the Mogollon Rim on the Payson Ranger District, Tonto National Forest, Southwestern Region. It was sighted 1815 hours and when observed from the air at 1330 hours, the Dude Fire was estimated at 5 acres and located just below the Mogollon Rim.

An hour later, the size had grown to 50 acres and at 1615 hours, it was reported over 100 acres with a spot fire about one mile east of the main fire.

By 1800 hours, 18 crews (360 firefighters) had been ordered in addition to the initial attack resources. A Type II Incident Management Team had been ordered earlier and was on the fire.

A Type I Incident Management Team was ordered at 2105 hours, on the 25th. The Team received a Line Officers briefing at 0430 hours, June 26.

Brisk down canyon winds pushed the fire to approximately 1900 acres by 0500 hours, on June 26, when winds subsided and the fire laid down.

The Perryville Crew arrived at the Payson Ranger District at approximately 1330 hours, Monday, June 25th. They were given instructions to eat and go to the Base Camp. While enroute to the Camp, following dinner, they were redirected to the Bonita Creek Subdivision on the fireline, arriving there about 0100 hours. Shortly after, they were moved again to the junction of Walk Moore Canyon and Control Road, arriving there at about 0230 hours.

The Crew began clearing a fireline up the jeep trail in Walk Moore Canyon. Part way up the Canyon, they were directed to continue the line along a power line right-of-way up to the Bonita Creek Subdivision. They arrived at the Subdivision at about 0500 hours, and worked there until 0900-1000 hours.

Following lunch they were directed to improve the dozer line, working down Walk Moore Canyon toward the Control Road where they had begun. By this time the jeep trail had been bladed by a dozer as a part of the fire control effort.

Type I Incident Management Team Operations Section Chief Derrick Cooke met with Type II Operations Section Chief Butch VanTilborg at about 1200 hours in the Bonita Creek Subdivision to discuss Overhead transition. Cooke made assignments to Type I Team Division Supervisors Bead, Bernal Gatewood and Jeffrey Whitney who also were in the area. Cooke then walked the fireline down Walk Moore Canyon from Bonita Creek, arriving at the Control Road at about 1415 hours.

A spot was reported below the Control Road on the west side at 1345 hours. Also, at approximately 1330 hours members of the Type II and Type I teams, when attempting to leave the Bonita Creek area found that it was surrounded by fire. Two dozeners were directed to build a safety zone within the burned area.

The Perryville Crew was located approximately one-third of the way down the Canyon, at about 1300 hours, when they ran out of water. Crew Boss Larry Terra took Crew Member Fred Hill and left to get water at the Control Road leaving Assistant Crew Boss Sandra Bachman in charge with Crew Representative Dave LaTour. Terra sent the water up the line on an all-terrain vehicle and began walking back with Hill.

The Crew gathered around the water supply, 3,300 feet from the Control Road, to fill their canteens. Just minutes after returning to work at about 1415-1420 hours, a Navajo crew member yelled “Get Out”. All of the Navajo and Perryville Crew members, realizing the fire was blowing up, immediately began running down Walk Moore Canyon toward the Control Road. Part way down, 11 members of the Perryville Crew
were cut off when the fire crossed the dozer line. They turned around and began running back up the Canyon with orders to deploy their shelters.

Crew Representative LaTour radioed that the Perryville Crew was deploying their shelters. Strike Team Leader Scopa forwarded the message to Operations Section Chief Cooke at 1423 hours.

Crew member Donald Love deployed the furthest up the dozer line. Curtis Springfield was to his left, William Davenport to his right and just below. LaTour was just below Davenport. Geoffrey Hatch was below this group, then Alex Conteras, James Denney and Bachman. James Ellis probably deployed somewhere nearby. Joseph Chacon deployed 60 feet below Bachman and Gregory Hoke approximately 400 feet below Chacon.

At the time of the deployment, Denney was assisting Bachman with getting her shelter out. He then went down the dozer line. He was later found lying under Chacon. Springfield yelled "I can't take it anymore", got up, stumbled into Love's shelter, then went down the dozer line to where he expired about 150 feet below Love.

The front of Hatch's shelter was either blown or kicked off. Since he had lost part of his protection, he got up and ran up the dozer line. He continued up the dozer line about 200 yards where he was seen by Zigzag Hotshot Crew Superintendent Paul Gleason. Gleason called for Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) assistance and reported to Cooke, at 1434 hours, that he had found an injured firefighter.

Sometime during the entrapment, Ellis got up and walked down the creek bed and dozer line and spoke to Hoke who was still under his shelter.

After the deployment site had cooled down, Davenport, Love, and La Tour got out of their shelters and proceeded down the dozer line toward the Control Road. They came to Hoke still in his shelter. The four continued down the Canyon and met Ellis coming up. The five then proceeded down Walk Moore Canyon where Ellis expired 800 feet from the Control Road. The remainder then continued on and met an Engine Crew on the Control Road at about 1505 hours.
B. Site Investigation

1. Maps
   (a.) State: Arizona
   (b.) Forest: Tonto NF
   (c.) Area: District
   (d.) Fire: Dude Incident
   (e.) Site: Walk Moore Canyon

2. Perryville Crew Member List
3. Crew Deployment Positions
4. Crew Equipment Location
1. Maps
2. Perryville Crew Member List
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Injured</th>
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<tr>
<td>LARRY TERRA</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>CSO</td>
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<td>SANDRA J. BACHMAN</td>
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<td>59979</td>
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<td>ALEX S. CONTRERAS</td>
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<td>JAMES L. DENNEY</td>
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<td>JAMES E. ELLIS</td>
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<td>CURTIS E. SPRINGFIELD</td>
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<td>57718</td>
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<td>GEOFFREY HATCH</td>
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<td>WILLIAM H. DAVENTPORT</td>
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<td>DONALD R. LOVE</td>
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<td>45301</td>
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<td>ROBERT M. CARRILLO</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>39380</td>
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<td>NORMAN ENRIQUEZ</td>
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<td>46541</td>
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<td>PATRICK A. FLIPPEN</td>
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<td>DERRICK E. GUY</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>36257</td>
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<td>GLEN A. HARDER</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>46793</td>
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<td>FRED HILL</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>FF</td>
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<td>37610</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIM SMITH</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>FF</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>63479</td>
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<td>STEVEN PENDER</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>FF</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>57518</td>
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</table>

1 Department of Correction's Personnel Number
2 Fire Pack Number
3 "No" means the person escaped; "Yes" means the shelter was deployed in some manner or not used.
3. Crew Deployment Positions
4. Crew Equipment Location
DUDE INCIDENT  8/26/90
Walk Moore Canyon  Tonto National Forest
CREW EQUIPMENT LOCATION
Perryville Crew

NOTE: GRAPHIC SKETCH AND FIELD DISTANCES NOT TO SCALE
1 CHAIN = 66 FEET
C. Witness List

An asterisk (*) indicates that the statement provide by the individual is in this report (See Section D). All other statements are a part of the supporting documents to this report and kept as part of our system of records.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Position</th>
<th>Home Unit</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Class I</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walt Shaw</td>
<td>Incident Commander</td>
<td>BIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Healy</td>
<td>Safety Officer</td>
<td>Gila NF</td>
<td>505-388-8241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Paxon</td>
<td>Public Info Officer</td>
<td>Gila NF</td>
<td>505-894-6677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Melcher*</td>
<td>FBA</td>
<td>Coconino NF</td>
<td>602-526-8223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derrick Cooke*</td>
<td>Ops Section Chief</td>
<td>Rgln Office</td>
<td>505-842-3266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Spann*</td>
<td>Communications Tech</td>
<td>Tonto NF</td>
<td>602-225-5200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ronald Regan*</td>
<td>Communications Tech</td>
<td>Coconino NF</td>
<td>602-527-7400</td>
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<tr>
<td>George Leech</td>
<td>Ops Section Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Class II</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ed Hollenshed*</td>
<td>Incident Commander</td>
<td>Prescott NF</td>
<td>602-445-1762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randy Cherington</td>
<td>Safety Officer</td>
<td>Tonto NF</td>
<td>602-488-3441</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pete Libby</td>
<td>Public Info Officer</td>
<td>Tonto NF</td>
<td>602-835-1181</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dale Ashby</td>
<td>Group F Supervisor</td>
<td>Tonto NF</td>
<td>602-474-2299</td>
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<td>Bob Ortlund</td>
<td>Air Attack</td>
<td>Tonto NF</td>
<td>602-467-2236</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phil Gil*</td>
<td>Division Supervisor</td>
<td>BLM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Butch Van Tilborg*</td>
<td>Ops Section Chief</td>
<td>Prescott NF</td>
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<td>Hall Ashcroft*</td>
<td>Safety Officer</td>
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<td>Glen Dundas*</td>
<td>OPS Section Chief</td>
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**Perryville Fire Crew**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Position</th>
<th>Home Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Larry Terra*</td>
<td>Corrections Serv. Off.</td>
<td>Perryville Detention Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don Love*</td>
<td>Crew Member</td>
<td>Perryville Detention Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fred Hill</td>
<td>Crew Member</td>
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<td>Robert Carrillo</td>
<td>Crew Member</td>
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<td>Patrick Flippen</td>
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<td>Norman Enriquez</td>
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<td>Gregory Hoke*</td>
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<td>Bill Davenport*</td>
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<td>Steve Pender</td>
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<td>Glenn Harder*</td>
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<td>Tim Smith</td>
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<td>Jeff Hatch</td>
<td>Crew Member</td>
<td>Perryville Detention Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dave LaTour*</td>
<td>Crew Rep.</td>
<td>Rural Metro, Tucson</td>
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18
### Other Fire Personnel

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>James W. Clawson</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Officer</td>
<td>Prescott NF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guy A. Jirrels</td>
<td>Fire Fighter</td>
<td>Chandler</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clifford Pearlberg</td>
<td>State Representative</td>
<td>AZ Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig Ellis*</td>
<td>Fire Weather Forecaster</td>
<td>Weather Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Berkovitz*</td>
<td>Fire-Weather Meteorologist</td>
<td>Phoenix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Tiffany*</td>
<td>Crew Foreman, Eng. 438</td>
<td>Payson RD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pat Velasco</td>
<td>Fire Mgt. Officer</td>
<td>Payson RD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alan Farnsworth*</td>
<td>FBA-Trainee</td>
<td>Payson RD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roy Sandoval</td>
<td>Rec. Guard, Eng. 438</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bob Scopa*</td>
<td>Fire Captain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Gleason*</td>
<td>Supt. Zig Zag Crew</td>
<td>Yavapai Fire Dept.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bobbie Ortland</td>
<td>FS Regulars</td>
<td>Mt. Hood NF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scott Hunt</td>
<td>District Forester</td>
<td>Tonto NF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jim Mattingly*</td>
<td>Foreman, Alpine Hot Shots</td>
<td>AZ Forestry Div.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bob Wagenfahr</td>
<td>Tonto NF Fire Staff</td>
<td>Zion NP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jeffrey Whitney*</td>
<td>Div./Sup.</td>
<td>Tonto NF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernal Gatewood*</td>
<td>Div./Sup., Div. “E”</td>
<td>Payson RD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Wes Romburger</td>
<td>Medical Examiner</td>
<td>Payson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Birgam</td>
<td>Deputy Sheriff</td>
<td>Gila County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Glossy</td>
<td>Air Attack (Trainee)</td>
<td>Region 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Sorrell*</td>
<td>Crew Boss</td>
<td>BIA Fort Defiance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Contact Information]
D. Records

1. Witness Statements
2. Incident Objectives
3. Fire Behavior Forecast
4. Health and Safety Message
5. Site Photographs
1. Witness Statements
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)
   ASHCROFT, HALL

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, Zip Code)
   TONTO MESA DIST. TYPE II TEAM

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)
    SAFETY OFFICER

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW
    [Location Information]

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW
    [Interviewer's Name]

15. STARTED
    Date: 6/28/90
    Time:

16. REMARKS
    WENT INTO BONITO MONDAY NIGHT. FOUND SEVERAL ENGINES WITH NO COMMUNICATIONS IN A POTENTIAL DEATH TRAP BECAUSE THEY WERE LOCATED IN A BRUSH FIELD. SERVED AS A SAFETY OFFICER BECAUSE OF PERSONAL CONCERN ABOUT SAFETY TIED IN WITH 2 DOZENS WHICH HAD CAME IN WITHOUT SUPERVISION, ABOUT 1200, WAS AWARE THAT THE FIRE HAD SPOTTED ACROSS THE LINE OF THE PREVIOUSLY BURNED OUT AREA.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

USDA
Forest Service

(Nature of Investigation)

Dude Fire Fatality

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Berkovitz, Robert

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

Phoenix, AZ

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

National Weather Service, Incident Fire Weather Forecaster

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

Incident Base

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

David W. Goens

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

16. REMARKS

Date       Time       Date       Time

6/29/00     1500       6/29/00     1600

DOCUMENTATION ON THE TUESDAY AFTERNOON INCIDENT ON THE DUDE FIRE...

I had arrived at the Dude fire camp a little after 12 noon on Tuesday, June 25. I had checked in shortly after. The class I team was due to start coming in around 1 pm. I did wait around the fire camp for the fire behavior analyst for about an hour or so, but since nobody showed up, I took my Compaq computer to the Payson Ranger station to hook to a phone in order to receive weather charts and other data. I was in Payson until around 5 pm.

While out at the fire camp earlier that afternoon, I did notice a convection column above the fire. There was a cloud cap that had developed above the smoke column. Someone said that they did see a few lightning strikes, and I did notice occasional bursts of static on the radio while driving to the camp. However, I did not hear any thunder.

I did meet the fire behavior analyst at the Payson Ranger district at about 4 or 4:30 and gave an informal briefing. I drove back out to the fire camp after receiving my charts, set my equipment up to read my charts and attended a more formal briefing later that evening.

Robert Berkovitz
Fire-weather meteorologist
USDA Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

(Reference FSH 5309.11)

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

COOKE, DICK

HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

RO - 3

EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

OPS SECT CHIEF TYPE I

LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

1. OTHERS PRESENT

NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

JERRY MONTGOMERY

ELDON ROSS

STARTED

Date

6/58

ENDED

Date

15. STARTED

Date

TIME

16. REMARKS

Got together w/ Pat Vail at 00 about 10:30 and went up to the fire. Pat was providing intelligence for future suppression actions. Drove up the control road and visited the Bonita Springs Sub-Division. Discussed hazards. Made contact with Ops Chief Vantilborg who was checking the burnout around the Sub-Division. A strike team of Type I engine was protecting the structures. Checked on the status of the Type I Division Sups. All were in the area. J. Whitney, B. Gatewood & Bead, 12:50-1:00. Division Sups had not tied in with their counterparts. Assigned Bead to the west side (Div A), assigned Gatewood to Div E from the control road at walk more canyon up to road 144. Whitney was to stay with the structure protection and burnout operations. Walked down toward walk more canyon and met with Engine 71/2 or Scoop. Pat V. was walking up walk more from the control road. Met with Pat part of the way down.

OUT
At 1315-1330 the crew sequence going down the canyon was: Alpine, His, Perryville & Navajo. No burn out was taking place.

Fire was backing down across the canyon about 1/3 the way from the top. Vegetation in walkmoor was much lighter than above. Air turbulence was also less. Heard a radio conversation that the fire had crossed the control road on the west side.

Arrived at the control road with Pat U. about 2:15.

At 2:23, got a notice from the engine at Col. that they thought there was a shelter deployment.

Sue Cooke’s Chronology

Was not aware of air attack (fixed wing) activity over the fire.

Was anticipating less problems below Bonita because of the lighter fuels.

Was not aware of any storm activity.

Believed he had never clearly transitioned responsibilities from Van Tilboro. Had a very short time to interact with the Type II team and consequently the transition did not go smoothly. However, didn’t believe it caused the accident.

Gleason & Scoop’s actions were very professional. Scoop heard on his radio that Perryville was going to deploy shelters.

Worst fire behavior seen in over 20 yrs of experience.
1572 - Strike Line
Shelter Deployment

234 - 7 crew reported dying near Simon home

237 - Strike called for warm blanket

242 - Strike team #1 at scene with medicine, warm blanket, etc.

246 - Ordered medical ship

252 - April 7th. Fire below. Recommended Erase 7 other Simon homes area

254 - Heard explosion from Simon Han area

- Dock crew spotted. Take at heel
- Dock crew - Spot 1/2 mile East of man fire

301 Simon claims all men missing. Every adult
unaccounted for.

301 Strike team 1 in black and apellido safe.
3:05 ½ crew of percy will walk out to control road
3:07 all Q Q Percy will not continue
3:15 admiral to order trauma stress unit

Act now west in Dusk area control hand across sec 21
spot fire west of 144 sec 21
NW of sec 34 through 33

3:14 - alfaro - helicopt 100 yd. above victim - cathy helicopt
3:25 - fire west on road on N E nunq
700 - spotted ½ mile 30 acres above nunq

3:35 - burn victim - lifted out
To base
3:39 - 2 rings and to hospital with Port Valence's people - 1 difficult

3:42 - Breath, 1 possible broken rib.

3:42 - Report 2 fatalities - Gleason - "I think"

3:44 - Report 2 I.C. fatalities - Leach

3:52 - Ordered Fatality Investigator Team

3:54 - Total of 6 fatalities, all other
one accounted for

4:17 - 35 in eastern. More troops in west slope! Negrop

4:44 - Called regard. Security. Stopped at steel bridge

4:50 - Min. Run on west, holding all
DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)
   Bill
   William Davisonport

7. HOME ADDRESS (SL City, State, ZIP Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)
Perrysville Crew, Monong

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW
   J. Moresmith
   E. Ross

14. OTHERS PRESENT

16. REMARKS
   Perrysville crew was mixed in with the Navajo. One of the Navajo crew yelled "got' out!" All crew started down the north line. Got cut-off by flame coming across the line, turned around and started running back to the north line. Don Love & La Tour were the only ones ahead. La Tour directed them to deploy shelters as they were running. Took back pack off & took out his shelter. Lost his glasses & Harley Davidson head band & hardhat after the deployment. Deployed #2 after deployment. Deployed next to Love. Deployed down the hill from the H2O jerry cans. Communicated with others through under shelter. La Tour was directly behind. After the front hit, heard one scream "I can't take it anymore." Two then screamed from fear. I turned about 1/2 hour & a branch dropped on this shelter & burned his legs. Burned+elias was from touching.
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

USDA Forest Service
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

DUNDAS, GLEN

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

Prescott N.F.

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Ops Section Chief

Type II Team

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

Monesmith, Eldon

ROSS

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date Time

16. REMARKS

Worked together with Ops Chief Van Tilborg who was handling the operations on the ground. Met with the Type I team at 4:130 and reconed the fire with George Leech at about 5:130. There was a problem with the transition of the division sups because only 2 came out to the fire rather than three. The strategy was to burn out around Bonita. Since they knew the team was going to be replaced, they double-dipped the division sups on the east side and the bottom. These were the critical areas. Met with Wagenfehr to agree on the strategy. Began monitoring the firing operation on both the east and west side beginning at about 10:00. Slope fires were occurring from the start without a southerly wind. Hot firing, but successful. Flew the fire at about 1300 with Leech. Winds were beginning to blow down slope, influenced by a thunderstorm. Talked to George about fire

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

FS-5300-19 (4/85)
Behavior. And the length of time the crews and crews had been on the line.

Pulled the crews back from the firing operations on the west side at about 1315-1330 because of the fire behavior. Attempted to contact the air attack, but he was monitoring the wrong freq. Finally bypassed the attack by using the pilot to communicate next to the lead plane. Had two different air attacks and the difference was like night and day. One didn't sound qualified and had difficulty lining out what appeared to be "clear" targets.

Was contacted by base that they needed my helicopter.

At 1345, instructed Butch that the control road was no longer defensible as the fire had crossed it. Butch drove down to check it and determined the road was not passable.

Turned responsibilities over to Leech and returned to the helibase about 1400. Remained frustrated because one of the type I supers (Biggs) still had come out to the fire to transition.
**USDA Forest Service**

**MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW**

3. **NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle):** Ellis, Craig

4. **SOCIAL SEC. NO.:**

5. **DOB:**

6. **SEX:**

7. **HOME ADDRESS (St. City, State, ZIP Code):** Phoenix, AZ

8. **DRIVER'S LIC. NO.:**

9. **PHONE (H) (Area Code):**

10. **EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location):** National Weather Svc - Fire Weather Forecaster

11. **PHONE (W) (Area Code):**

12. **LOCATION OF INTERVIEW:** NWS Forecast Office Phoenix, AZ

13. **NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW:** David W. Goeck

14. **OTHERS PRESENT:**

15. **STARTED**

16. **ENDED**

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<th>Date</th>
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<th>Time</th>
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16. **REMARKS:**

July 26, 1990

Telephone Weather Discussion for Dude Fire northeast of Payson from Craig Ellis - Fire Weather Forecaster.

Fire Behavior Officer Trainee called from Dude Fire (northeast of Payson) late morning and asked for weather forecast update. Told him similar conditions as past 24 hours with variable winds mostly from the north or downslope late night and early morning hours occasionally to 15 MPH becoming mostly from the southwest or upcanyon upslope 10 to 20 MPH. Few thunderstorms in the area during afternoon hours with little or no rain. Strong gusty variable winds near thunderstorms on radar near the fire already.

17. **OFFICER'S SIGNATURE:**

18. **WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable):**
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

2. NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Fire Fatality

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Farnsworth, Alan

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Type I Fire Behavior Analyst Trainee (SWNS Team)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

Telephone

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

<table>
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<tr>
<td>7/3/90</td>
<td>1700</td>
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</table>

16. REMARKS

Telephone interview for the purpose of determining if the Fire Weather Forecast record @ 11:40 6/26 was transmitted to the line.

Farnsworth indicated he had talked to the NWS Weather Service forecaster Craig Ellis and when he needed a forecast for the night shift plan. The forecast was made and Ellis mentioned that Thunderstorm clouds would move across the area. I asked Farnsworth if he had given this information to any of the line personnel. He indicated he had only given it to the person responsible for the night shift plan. The comment is that "everyone knew there were thunderstorms in the area" so he did not feel it was necessary to call the line with the information.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

[Signature]

[Signature]
**MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW**  
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

2. **NATURE OF INVESTIGATION**
   
   Dude Incident - Deployment Facilities

3. **NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)**
   
   Bernal Gatewood

4. **SOCIAL SEC. NO.**

5. **DOB**

6. **SEX**

7. **HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)**
   
   Fort Apache - White River

8. **DRIVER'S LIC. NO.**

9. **PHONE (H) (Area Code)**

10. **EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)**

   B.I.A.

11. **PHONE (W) (Area Code)**

12. **LOCATION OF INTERVIEW**

   Dude Base Camp

13. **NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW**

   Hank Walters

14. **OTHERS PRESENT**

15. **STARTED**

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<td>6/29</td>
<td>approx 0620</td>
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16. **ENDED**

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<tr>
<td>6/29</td>
<td>approx 0635</td>
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17. **REMARKS**

   AN INTERVIEW was held with Bernal Gatewood "Division Superin-  
   tison E" assigned to the "Show" Incident Command  
   Management Team. Bernal's assignment was to continue  
   live construction from 3/10 east of the Bonta Creek  
   Estates towards the "Show" Incident Area. He had no  
   knowledge of the activity taking place in Division "E"  
   which was the Bonta Creek Shores Estates. The first  
   he had heard of the deployment was at approximately  
   1430. He was last seen at the Division breaks because of  
   the lack of maps showing the Division. His primary objec-  
   tive was to continue the work started by the Class II Team.
USDA Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

FATALITIES

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)
   Gill, Phil

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)
   Kingman, BLM, AZ

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)
    Div. Super Type II Team

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW
    Jerry Moncton with Eldon Ross

14. OTHERS PRESENT
    [Handwritten notes]

15. STARTED
    Date       Time
    6/28       10:35

16. REMARKS
    Served as Div Sup and assisted Dan Eckstein
    because of the emphasis to protect the Bonita
    Subdivision. Acted as the firing boss.
    Began back-firing at about 1100.
    Div. Sup Whitney, Div Sup Type I team joined
    them at 10-1100.
    Zigzag crew was doing the firing.
    A drizzle started shortly after 1100 from
    a cumulus cloud.
    Thunderstorm winds occurred
    in the camp.
    Had difficulty holding the line all morning.
    Lost a spot earlier which they planned to line
    with a dozer later in the day.
    They left to return to camp at 2:00-2:15 and
    had Whitney with them. When they tried to
    leave the subdivision they found to their
    surprise, that it was surrounded by fire. They
    returned and had two dozers build a safety
    zone in the black.
    Dundas had sounded some alarm at about
    2:00 in reporting the fire had spotted across the

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)
CONTROL ROAD WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO BE THE LAST RESORT.

Communication problems existed because of too many people on the same field, had off & on contact and poor communications with the Air Attack.

Thought the division ended at about 3rd Point 1.

Thought the transition did not go smoothly and that transitioning during the hot burning period was asking for it.

Whitney & others did a good job of dealing with the situation once it blew.

Knew they had a dangerous fire and was not surprised it blew, but was surprised at the intensity. Everyone was in safety zones in plenty of time. Lookouts had been posted all day.

Thought there were 2 Air Attacks.
**Nature of Investigation**

**Dude Fire Fatalities**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>3. Name of Person Interviewed (Last, First, Middle)</th>
<th></th>
<th>4. Social Sec. No.</th>
<th>5. DOB</th>
<th>6. Sex</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paul Gleason</td>
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<td>Zig Zag Hot Shot Crew Foreman</td>
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<th>12. Location of Interview</th>
<th>13. Name of Officer Conducting Interview</th>
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<td>Dining area</td>
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Talked down with Paul Lindsay.
Alpine crew was running up the line.
Fire was spreading about 80 ft/min, mostly in the crowns.
It was not an independent crown fire.
Burned in little strips. Not a wall of flame.
Spreading cross-slope.
There were down drafts.

Wallowa is a V shaped valley.
There would be cross-slope radiation and tremendous heat release.
The thunder head would keep the heat down.
Felt there was no effect on the main fire by the burnout.
There were strong convective currents.
It was a wind-driven fire.

6/30/90

Burnout in 150-200 ft.
In strips in perpendicular to the cat line.
Green patch was left due to burnout.
10 mph wind.

Burn 300-400 ft. strips.
1/2 hr after deployment.
Lots of smoke on south of not.
Looked like a wind-driven fire, not convective.
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE INCIDENT ENTRAPMENT

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

GLEASON, PAUL

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

M

7. HOME ADDRESS (SL. CITY, STATE, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Supt. Big Bug Inc. Mt. Hood N.F.

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

INCIDENT BASE CAMP

Putnam/Mangan - Mt. DC

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

6/29/90

16. REMARKS

The Big Bug Inc. was involved in dozer operations on 6/26/90 in the vicinity of the Bodin Creek subdivision, along with the Flathead, Alpine, and Redmond Inc. at times. His crew had hiked up Walker Canyon from the control road, and passed the Beaver and Navaho #2 crews who were widening lines. About 1345-1400 some light precipitation fell on the fire site, and a thunder cell was observed in the area.

Roughly 1/2 hour later, the radio reports indicated that the fire had crossed the "control road", the fire line, and that there had been a shelter deployment. The Big Bug Inc. and Flathead Inc. headed S.W. toward the area, and passed the Alpine Inc. heading up the fire line toward the safety zone. The fire was making cross-slope runs from west to east in the crowns at 80 feet/minute.

A person (geek with hat) came walking up the dozer line, with no hard hat, fire shelter or tool. His back pack was smoking, as was his flare (?). Gleason called on the radio for EMT's, and they came from the Big Bug, Flathead and Alpine Inc. at times; the paramedics in Engine 5-T. #1 also responded. Gleason sent the remainder of his Inc. with the Flathead Inc. to the safety zone because of the immediate fire danger.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)
DUDU INCIDENT ENTRAPMENT

GLEASON, PAUL

16. REMARKS


NOTHING FOLLOWS
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

USDA Forest Service

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION
Dade Fire Incident

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)
   GUILLERMO HERNANDEZ
   TIMOTHY SMITH

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)
    MERRIVILLE CREW MEMBERS

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW
    MOSES SMITH

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED
   Date: 6/29
   Time: 2:30

16. REMARKS
   They were clearing brush. Smith & an Indian looked up & saw the fire & heard it. The Indian yelled to get out. It was understood by the crew that the escape route was down the dozer trail. Did not know that personnel were trapped behind them. Saw Bachman fall. Dennis was helping pick up. Met Terra heading back up. Never pulled shelters. They tried to pull them out but couldn't open the shelter packs because of the backpack full of fuses & could not feel with his hands. Suggest shelters be rolled & positioned in front. Been on several fires. Navajo came back up & encouraged them to leave. Heard explosions & were running under a ceiling of fire with fire whirls mixed in.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)
All the crew were within 200 yards of any cans when the blowup occurred.
**USDA Forest Service**

**MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW**

(Reference FSH 5309.11)

**NATURE OF INVESTIGATION**
Code Fire Incident Fatalities

**3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)**
Gregory, Hote

**4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.**
41497

**5. DOB**

**6. SEX**

**7. HOME ADDRESS (St. City, State, Zip Code)**
Lemoyne Correction Ctr.

**8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.**

**9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)**

**10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)**
San Pedro Fire Area #2

**11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)**

**12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW**
Lemoyne, MT.

**13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW**
Frank Quintana, Lee Leding

**14. OTHERS PRESENT**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/29</td>
<td>1:25</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**16. REMARKS**

I had just finished my beat (Swampy for Joe Charon) we were at the water tanks about that time I heard some one say "get the truck out" I began running with (Alex Contreras - Lemoyne Crew). I thought of running, but I decided to deploy the shelter. The wind was very strong, it almost blew me over. I was in my shelter about 20 min. I heard Ellis (James) out side my shelter he said "Is hurt bad", "my shelter didn't work". I think there were two blow overs. I tried him to get some water from my back why didn't take so long for people to come to help.
**MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW**

**USDA Forest Service**

**NATURE OF INVESTIGATION**

**Dude Fire Fatalities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)</th>
<th>4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.</th>
<th>5. DOB</th>
<th>6. SEX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hoke, Greg.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<th>7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)</th>
<th>8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.</th>
<th>9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perryville State Prison</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)</th>
<th>11. PHONE (M) (Area Code)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inmate</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW</th>
<th>13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.O.C. office</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. OTHERS PRESENT</th>
<th>15. STARTED</th>
<th>ENDED</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.O.C. officer</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6/29/90</td>
<td>13:10</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. REMARKS</th>
<th>ENDED</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6/29/90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REMARKS**

Woke up and heard sanding. He had an axe. He heard shouting and saw flames. He and contures were together.

Ran down and saw fire cross in front of him. Turned and saw flames cross above him between trees.

Took pack off and shelter out. It opened first try. But to be separated from pack halfway down so tore off pack. Wind blew hard—almost blew shelter over. Turned himself by calling for help every minute. Another blast came from other side. After about down Ellis came by said shelter didn't exist.

Ellis said Hoke told him to get water from pack. Hoke told him to get water from pack. Ellis said it was burned. He said shelter was spent and that he had to walk back.

**17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE**

[Signature]

**18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (if Applicable)**

[Signature]
He remembers near of shelter ripped out.

Then love to Ford, Davenport and Ellis (he was surprised to see Ellis - thought he had gone down line). They reached hose lay when Ellis said he was dead & walked over to ditch and sat down and died. He + love continued to road. Love had radio could receive but not send. Did get response at road and was told to go right. They threw shelter down.

Remember Davenport and love falling back behind them as they came down.

After 2nd wave of fire he looked out + saw flames on ground close to him so inched shelter up about 10 ft which was mistake since ground was very hot.

Remember having hard time getting to shelter behind him.

It was calm before fire.

He wants crew to continue.

He had heard that Dean went back to help Sandy with shelter. He got burned. Chacon layed on top of him to help. Wondered why no-one was looking for them.
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

USDA
Forest Service
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION
DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)
   ED HOLLERSTEAD

7. HOME ADDRESS (St. City, State, ZIP Code)
   PRECOTT N.F.

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)
   IC Type II Team

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW
   J. Moniz

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED
   Date  Time
   6/28/90  10:00

16. REMARKS

   TRIED TO TRANSITION WITH THE TYPE I TEAM
   AT 1300. TRANSITION WAS A PROBLEM IN THAT IT
   DIDN'T APPEAR THE INCOMING TEAM WAS RECOGNIZING
   FIRE BEHAVIOR AND OTHER CONCERNS. TWO DIVISION
   SUPS. FROM THE TYPE I TEAM CAME OUT TO
   THE FIRE AT 0600 TO SHADOW WITH THE TYPE
   II DIVISION SUPS. UNTIL 1300. HOWEVER, THE
   TYPE II DIVISION SUPS. STAYED ON THE FIRE
   THROUGHOUT THE SHIFT.

   AT 11:00, LINE PERSONNEL WERE BECOMING
   UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT THE SITUATION.

   COMMUNICATIONS WERE A PROBLEM, THE OVERHEAD
   WAS OPERATING ON A TONTO FIRE FREQ. WHILE
   THE CREWS WERE ON A STATE FREQ.

   DID A STANDUP INCIDENT ACTION PLAN
   TWO PEOPLE WERE CHANGING OFF AS AIR ATTACK.

   DID NOT PERFORM WELL AND WAS NOT RESPONSIVE
   TO THE NEEDS OF THE GROUND PERSONNEL

   ONCE IN A LIFE-TIME FIRE BEHAVIOR SITUATION

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)
Dave was laying on the couch with both legs wrapped and one arm wrapped. I asked him to start at the initial phone call. He was called by the state Division of Forestry at 2 PM on 6/30 to go to Payson as a Crew Rep for the Payson Fire. Payson was at Payson @ 9:15 PM. He went into work at Payson @ 9:15 PM. He lived in a house in Payson and was sent to Box 450 to work in the area. They prepared to setup about 11:15 AM. At BC they prepared to setup the homes. He held a safety meeting with emphasis on fire conditions and making sure all had shelters and escape routes. Vehicles were parked out. Dale Ashby was Division Supervisor. He told them to cut a line to crack and set up at 7 PM to crack and clear the telephone line and then up that line to BC.
While on furo line they were passed by a Hotshot crew (H.C.). They continued to do line until light and then worked on safety homes and dozer line. Tuck breakfast break around 9 AM with HC. Ashby then told them to improve line downhill for burnout. They went below Alpine HC and started work. He only had his radio on the State Freq. (151.280). They couldn’t reprogram to Ashby Freq so he programmed his Freq into Ashby’s. They had good comms all morning with occasional lapse. While Ashby switched to other channel, T. Ome and also had radios. Also Scope on engine Test Force. He could see some fire in distance above them along with slurry drops. Some rains but well above HC on other side of Wulf Moore. Ashby (A) alerted them to watch for spot fires. Crew was satisfied and began to watch. Fire would come to ridge and die down. Some talk on his radio from engine crews. Around 11:30 he asked A for water but none came. During morning the Zig Zag & Redmond HC passed them on the way up. About an hour apart. He still had crews spread out and watching for spots. The Alpine foreman had a shift plan with a Freq, but he couldn’t get it for...
work. A called to be sure they were spread out, searching for spots and improving line. Could see main fire slowing coming down but not in their drainage. At lunch with Alpine HC leader. There was some wind, squally with some spots showing up in drainage. He put crew back to improving line. A called and said stay below Alpine HC. They had about a 200 yd gap between them. About 1-1.30 it got smoked in. He was hit by a 40-50 mph wind, down drafts and squally. It got dark like a sunset. He ran down to crew, heard shooting about evacuating. Embroy the size of pine cones were falling. Had not talked to KA since noon. He had been told their escape route was downhill. When he got to crew he could hear shooting and see people running, down hill. Heard yelling, saw people coming back and a solid wall of fire behind them. It was screaming, ear deafening. He turned and went back telling people to get shelters out but don't deploy until up hill. There were 2 people ahead of him and about half way up hill they had to deploy. The others deployed in drainage. He asked for a more exact
and ordered they were deploying. He then began to talk to those around him to stay calm, to talk to him, that they would make it. To stay in the shelters. He could hear voices above & below him, probably 2 or 3 below him. The fire hit on the down hill left side of shelter. Tree, it badly lifted it, hurt debris came under but he held it down. Heard lots of noise and screaming. He looked on left side of shelter, had delaminated and was flopped on left side. He knew he was burning bad but stayed on his right side with back to right side of shelter. Another fire came from the right and finally a third one. He heard someone stand up and follow his tent. Screaming continued through all 3 fires. He heard shelters moving and kept telling them to stay put. He kept talking to them & consoling them. They asked if they or to go out & he told them to stay put. He tried calling on radio but no answer from all channels. Heard some traffic that helped us on the way. He waited about an hour, shook hand out - it was cooler (no help had come) he sat up saw & below him, capped & standing
told them to keep on. Help was on the way then he saw some of the crew was dead. He waited a little while then told 2 aboves to get up and don't look - that a tragedy had happened and they had to get out. He was weak and shaky but they started down. He saw one body move but knew the person was dying or dead. At end of bodies he saw one shelter completely deteriorated and asked if OK got an answer and got the person up. It appeared some had moved since they had no shelters. They started downhill and passed another shelter with person in it. He got out and joined them. Don (?) and Davenport were about him. 1 person just in fiberglass below him. Plus 1 shelter. They all started out. 3 went ahead. Davenport stayed to help him since he was weak and wandering. All had shelters wrapped around them. They got to the road and no one was there to help. He tried the radio - no answer - took mike off and got Chief - he told them to turn right. They walked about 200 yds and a F.S. pickup met them and took them to clearing where gear was removed and 1st aid administered. Fire flared up. They were given shelters.
and moved by truck to base camp
more 1st aid and then flight to
hospital

He had all his gear and remembers
carrying a 5 gal water container.
He remembers telling Irene to go
get water for Grens which was
delivered by ATV.

Remembers some radio talk about
1/2 hour before fire about it burning
Faulk Canyon which is West of them.
Smoke near 450 to 1hr before fire
long before Fire there was a small
drop to east of them.

He's been a Fireman 17 yrs - Red
Carded 1st Fore leader - Training for
DIV. Sup. Beam of Yellowstone & Oregon
A number's State fires in 5. part of
state.

He has had a lot of training courses
Would like to locate his year tu wallet.
His wife came in so I thanked
him and went to see Chief Honey
for copy of his training records.

Talked Honey now arrangement
with State Works. He said employees
are allowed to work for State who
pay's them and they can take leave
with or w/o pay from Rural Metro.

S. Beddell
Prior to leaving his home, I reviewed his personal training file which contained the following:

EMS, EMT  8/13/78
Fireman I  11/28/79
Fireman II  8/31/79
Recruit Fire Training  10/28/79
Basic Wildland Fire  3/28/81
Fire Officer Development  5/10/89
Fire Command  7/7/83
Emergency Stabilization  9/23/84
Vertical Rescue  10/28/84
S-230 Crew Leader  85
Driver  11/27/85
National Fire Academy - Fire Supervisor  2/12/86

He also stated he had completed the following:

Fire Fighter Safety & Survival  89
Division Supervision  89
Search and Rescue - Cut and run  93
**MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW**

**USDA Forest Service**

(Reference FSH 5309.11)

**NATURE OF INVESTIGATION**

**DUDE FIRE FATALITIES**

**NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED** (Last, First, Middle)

Don Love

**SOCIAL SEC. NO.**

**DOB**

**SEX**

**HOME ADDRESS** (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

**DRIVER'S LIC. NO.**

**PHONE (H) (Area Code)**

**EMPLOYMENT** (Occupation and Location)

Perryville Crew, Assist Sd Bos

**LOCATION OF INTERVIEW**

J. Moneymith

**NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW**

Eldon Ross

**OTHERS PRESENT**

**STARTED**

Date Time  
6/29 12:05

**ENDED**

Date Time

**REMARKS**

Felt the fire shelters worked. Tried gathering to get drinking water. After getting water, proceeded to improve the line. Shortly afterward, an Navajo crew member yelled "Get out." All of the crew began running down the road toward the control road. Fire had crowned over the double line and split the crew. His surrogate hatchet, Donny, continued. Chacon, Ellis, Springfield, Davenport, LaTour, & Bachman, were above the remainder went down. Heading toward Bonita. LaTour gave directions to deploy their shelters. LaTour radioed that Perryville was deploying shelters. Donny was helping Bachman take her shelter out. Donny, Davenport, Springfield & LaTour proceed up another 5 yards. Chacon had deployed his shelter. Springfield was in his. Donny got in his. Also Davenport & LaTour. Communication from LaTour to stay calm. Fire hit & Louis House & Borden's and lost to keep.
DAVISPORT got out of his shelter, love
LA TOUR did also. LA TOUR directed
them to wrap the shelters around
them & move down the canyon toward
control road. Came to Sandy who had
her hand on her head back as if she was to
get her shelter. Then Denny & Chacon.

Chacon was lying on Denny.
continued & run into Greg Hoke who
was in his shelter. Greg went with
them. continued & met Ellis coming
up the canyon. He had serious burns.
Shelter was hanging down from his
head. He turned around & continued
with them. Ellis said he was dead.
He went towards a hose & rolled off
into a ditch. Love called on radio &
continued pumper truck & kept
going to the control road. turned to
the right. After getting to the road, love
& hose dropped their shelters there.

Ellis jumped off shelter...
**USDA Forest Service**

**MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW**

(Reference FSN 8309.11)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Investigation</th>
<th>Dude Fire Fatalities</th>
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<tr>
<th>3. Name of Person Interviewed (Last, First, Middle)</th>
<th>Jim Mattingly</th>
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<th>7. Home Address (City, State, ZIP Code)</th>
<th>Zion N.P.</th>
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<th>10. Employment (Occupation and Location)</th>
<th>Alpine Hot Shot Foreman</th>
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<tr>
<th>12. Location of Interview</th>
<th>Dining area</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>13. Name of Officer Conducting Interview</th>
<th>Pat Andrews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>14. Others Present</th>
<th>Gary Benson Crew member</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>15. Started</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6/29/90</td>
<td>0630</td>
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<tr>
<th>16. Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belt weather obs taken on fire. Records with fire weather meteorologist report. 0810, 0900, 0930, 1000, 1100, 1130, 1230, 1310, 1330, 1400. Rain drops recorded at 1310. Dead calm for 5-10 min just before blowup. Erratic (speed &amp; direction) winds 1230 - 1400. 1400 - note of gusty winds - 5-10 sec gusts. The frankline around the cabin helped give them direction to the safety zone. Programmed the Perryville radio @ 1400 to match his. OK - but not all the time. Tried to contact them - no answer. Mattingly was walking up the trail 25 ft behind Glenmore Lindsay. Hated came out of the smoke at 1433 (according to Mattingly - just estimated).</td>
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<tr>
<th>17. Officer's Signature</th>
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| 18. Witness' Signature (If Applicable) | |
|---------------------------------------| |
The fire kept coming.
Not a wall of flames.
Fingers burned up the slope.
Victim said, "It's gonna get me." - Tried to sit up.

Ashly was the original fire boss.
They were given maps and 1 radio channel 170.500 to work.
Took off Hatch's chaps - left them on the line.
Maltz kept Hatch's shirt & gloves. (later given to investigator team)

1000 - engine captains radioed in -
"We won't stay during the burning show without shelter.
At least 20 people were up there without shelter.
They seemed more concerned with saving structure.
1300-1330 - the spot really went. They fought the spot inside the burn.
1350-1400 - maps went great.
Maltz took to improve line.

At briefing, they were told that the gas spread from 100 to 1500 acres from 100 to 500 feet. Reflected,
"Should we have been in there at all?"
Hatch was carrying his gloves. They were not damaged.
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW  
USDA Forest Service  

2. NATURE OF INVESTIGATION  
Dude Fire Fatalities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)  
Mercher, Ron

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.  

5. DOB  

6. SEX  

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)  

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.  

9. PHONE (H)  (Area Code)  

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)  
Type I Fire Plane Analyst (Shaw's Team)

11. PHONE (W)  (Area Code)  

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW  
Telephone

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW  
David W. Goans

14. OTHERS PRESENT  

15. STARTED  
Date  Time
7/3/90  1600

16. REMARKS  
Telephone interview for the purpose of determining if the forecast received by Farnsworth & Melcher @ 11:00 6/26 was transmitted to the line.

Melcher indicated Farnsworth had received the forecast via Telephone from the Natl. Weather Spec. in Phoenix at around 11:00.

Melcher transcribed the forecast for the shift plan, but indicated that the information was not transmitted to the line that Thunderstorms were developing in the area.

Note: Forecast copied by Melcher from Farnsworth's note and statement by Craig Eller, Frank Feyer, Phoenix on included in the witness statements and document files.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE  
David W. Goans

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)  

FS-5300-19 (4/89)
**USDA Forest Service**

**MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW**

(Reference FSH 5308.11)

**DATE OF INVESTIGATION**

**Dude Fire Fatalities**

**NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED** (Last, First, Middle)

Ron Melcher

**HOME ADDRESS** (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

**EMPLOYMENT** (Occupation and Location)

FBA - Type I Team

**LOCATION OF INTERVIEW**

Car - on the way to the site

**OTHERS PRESENT**

**NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW**

Pat Andrews

**REMARKS**

0600-0800 6/26 - at the Bonita Creek subdivision, sitting on the water tank on the NE corner.

0630 - retardant drop on the west side of the canyon.

Winds were calm.

The fire was "cooking" under an inversion.

Went looking for Bob Berkowitz (fire weather meteorologist) who had just gotten assigned to the fire.

It was after 1300 - went to get lunch.

A convection column was building.

1315 Dusty winds in camp - like from a thunder head.

5-6 drops of rain

Heard that there was a spot over the Control Road.

Took the truck to Payson.

There was a shower for 1/2 - 3/4 mile - enough to use the wipers.

Found out that Berkowitz was in camp setting up a RAWS.
as at the District Office when he heard that there was deployment.

The steel bridge on the way to the fire stopped a tractor operator from going to get his tractor. Cpl. Dick Coke—suggested that they evacuate more homes.

The travel to fire delayed maybe 5 minutes by talking to people along the road.

At the base of Walkmore Canyon found 2 people walking with their shelters. The hard hat on—held the shelter tightly around his face.

Donald Love & Jeff Hoke loaded them into the pickup car into a NW Fire Dept. truck which had EMTs. Transfered the people to them.

Went back toward Walkmore & found two more people. David Latour & Connie Davenport. One said, "There's four dead guys up there."

David Latour had all of his equipment on.
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

USDA
Forest Service

(Duplicate) Reference FSH 5309.11

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Fire Fatalities

NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Ron Melcher. (Mark Zumwalt)

HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

SOCIAL SEC. NO.

DOB

SEX

DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

PHONE (H) (Area Code)

EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

Pat Andrews

OTHERS PRESENT

STARTED

7/2/90

ENDED

Date

Time

am.

Date

Time

REMARKS

This is second-hand information

Ron Melcher talked to Mark Zumwalt, Div/Sup
on the rim on 6/26. (Ron talked to Mark, then called Pat)

Conducting a lookout on the top of the rim
by the 300 road.

They were staying just ahead of the movement
of the main fire.

The smoke was shooting down off the rim. (See box top)

He was in the center of Section 21.

There was lots of heat in Section 28.

The smoke from Sect. 21 was being sucked into Sect. 28.

5 minutes before Bonita blew, the fire in
Section 28 blew up and ran into Sections 32 & 34
and down to the SE toward Ellison Creek Subdivision
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

USDA Forest Service

(Nature of Investigation)

DUKE INCIDENT-ENTRAPMENT

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)
   Scola, Bob

7. HOME ADDRESS (St. City, State, ZIP Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)
   Fire Corp Central Yavapai Fire Dept

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW
   Post Camp

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW
   Dick Mansan - MTOC

15. STARTED
   Date  Time
   6/29/90

16. REMARKS
   Bob Scola was the engine strike team leader for the S.T. at Bonita Creek Subdivision. He worked on structure protection for division supervisors Ashby and Whitney. His communication was on the interagency NIMIS freq (154.280), and he had talked with the crew freq from Perrville. When the type II/Type I team transition occurred, he could not talk directly with Div. Sup. Whitney.

   Scola got a radio call on 154.280 indicating "Perrville has deployed." He asked the person to repeat the crew name; the response was again "Perrville has deployed; there's 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 people." Scola got a tactical radio from the PAO at Bonita Creek safety zone, and immediately called Div. Sup. Whitney to report the deployment. Upon hearing about the walking burned victim (Hatch) with the zig zag IHC's, Scola went with the Glendale Fire Dept Paramedics to assist. Because of their advanced skills, the Paramedics relieved the IHC EMT's, and sent them to the safety zone. After starting an I.V.,

--- NEXT PAGE ---
**NATURE OF INVESTIGATION**

**Dude Incident - Entrapment**

**NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)**

Scopa, Bob

**HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)**

**EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)**

**LOCATION OF INTERVIEW**

**OTHERS PRESENT**

15. **STARTED**  
Date  Time  ENDED  Date  Time

13. **NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW**

**REMARKS**

The 4 paramedics and Scopa began hauling match on a backboard to the evacuation point. The fire continued to make a run on them, and they questioned if they could continue to haul match and still save themselves. They kept moving, and finally reached the safety zone with match. Scopa felt the 4 Glendale paramedics were worthy of special commendation for their actions.

Scopa had no communications with the Perryville crew just prior to the announcement of the deployment, and did not know who the person on the radio was.

Nothing follows.

17. **OFFICER'S SIGNATURE**

18. **WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)**
**USDA Forest Service**

**MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW**

(Reference FSH 5309.11)

**NATURE OF INVESTIGATION**

**DIDE INCIDENT ENTRAPMENT**

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)
   
   SCOPA, Bob

7. HOME ADDRESS (ST, City, State, ZIP Code)
   
   FIRE Ctr, CENTRAL YANAPA, FIRE DEPT

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)
   
   FIRE COR CENTRAL YANAPA, FIRE DEPT

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW
   
   BARDST CAMP

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW
   
   DICK MANSAN - MTDC

15. STARTED
   
   Date: 6/29/90
   
   Time: 00:00

18. REMARKS

Bob Scopa was the engine strike team leader for the J.T. at Bonita Creek substation. He worked on structure protection for division supervisors Ashley A. Whitney. His communication was on the Interagency NIMS Freq (154.280), and he had talked with the crew FPA from Perryville. When the Type II/Type I team transition occurred, he could not talk directly with Div. Sup. Whitney.

Scopa got a radio call on 154.280 indicating "Perryville has deployed." He asked the person to repeat the crew name; the response was again "Perryville has deployed; there's 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 people." Scopa got a tactical radio from the PAO at Bonita Creek Safety Zone and immediately called Div. Sup. Whitney to report the deployment. Upon hearing about the walking burned victim (Nathan) with the big bang IHC's, Scopa went with the Glendale Fire Dept Paramedics to assist. Because of their advanced skills, the Paramedics relieved the IHC EMT's, and sent them to the safety zone. After starting an I.V.,

--- NEXT PAGE ---
**USDA Forest Service**

**MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW**

(Reference FSH 5309.11)

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### NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

**DUDE INCIDENT: ENTRAPMENT**

#### NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

**Scopa, Bob**

#### HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

#### EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

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#### LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

#### OTHERS PRESENT

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#### STARTED

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
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#### ENDED

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### REMARKS

The 4 Paramedics and Scopa began hauling hatch on a back board to the evacuation point. The fire continued to make a run on them, and they questioned if they could continue to haul hatch and still save themselves. They kept moving, and finally reached the safety zone with hatch. Scopa felt the 4 Glendale Paramedics were worthy of special commendation for their actions.

Scopa had no communications with the Perryville crew just prior to the announcement of the deployment, and did not know who the person on the radio was.

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17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)
Supply—No radio(s) for crew boss. Dave Dennison had the only King radio, which we brought with us from Ft. Defiance. It was clone by communications at fire camp.

At Briefing, S.T.L. Van Tilboard was our contact at Bonita Creek.

We arrived at Bonita Creek Sub-division-housings. D. Dennison tried to contact, over the radio, with S.T.L. Negative Contact.

We left, back to control road #64. We met Van Tilboard at the intersection. He briefed Dave and I. Our instructions were to go back to

Over the line. We walked approximately 1 mile until we met up with the crew rep. Dave ? for the Perryville crew.

I spoke with Dave. We exchanged fire status, weather conditions, watch-out situations, and last, but (not least) lease escape routes.

I strung out my crew back down the dozer-line.

All this time, we still had no communications with the outside forces, besides the Perryville crew and among ourselves.

I walked the line a few times. I warned my crew about what a dangerous place we were in. Of the sudden wind changes, the wind was erratic. Our escape route was the same place we came in from. That was the only way out. There were tons of unburned fuel, the forest was dense, between the fire and us.

I warned them of the slurry drops.

Dave of the Perryville crew inform (informed) me of the duty changes. We were to help his crew reinforcing (reinforce) the dozer-line. They had a couple of chain-saws.

I walked back down the line to inform my crew, and I also told them to move up the line to help the others.

Meanwhile the fire had moved past us, towards the control road—south southwest of where we were working.

My post-lookout (Edison Notah) notice (noticed) the windshift changes to the east. The fire started crowning. We yelled to everyone to
start running back down the dozer-line. The smoke was so intense, we could barely see 20-30 feet in front of us.

Some members made it down the line faster than others. Some just ditched their tools.

Some Perryville crew members ran by us. Some of them, behind me were running with their chain-saws. We told them to ditch the saws and run, but they did not.

I sort of stayed behind the Perryville crew. Because two of my crew members panic (panicked). They did not want to run any farther.

One of them asked me to leave and run for my life. But I couldn't. I took her pack and we kept on going.

The fire was right on our tail. We could hear the roaring and crackling, running sound. I thought about deploying my fire shelter right then, because both of my crew members stopped again.

Some how, I encouraged them to keep on going. We stopped about 4 times. (They told we ran .7 miles.)

We finally reached the control road and there were vehicles packed, and everyone on my crew made it out in a vehicle.

All this time a helicopter was above us and not once did he inform us of the situation.

No communications.

The Perryville crew were cut in half. Some made it out with us, others were trapped behind us.

2 of the ten-standard firefighting orders were ignored, and a few of the watch-outs situations.
MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION
DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)
MARK SPANN, COMM TECH TONTO

NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW
JERRY MONK SMITH

HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

OTHERS PRESENT

STARTED

ENDED

REMARKS
Ron was dispatched to the fire Monday night at about 1:00. The Type II team was in place.
The team had brought a BIFC radio system with them and had placed a repeater on the rim.
A communication plan had been put in place by Rufus Cole.
Everyone was still on the Tonto net on the 26th. There was lack of direction on the line, groups were agreeing among themselves on the frequencies they would use.
Everyone was complaining about not being able to talk to anyone.
The initial set up had problems. Someone called Communications (at the base camp) for a Medvac, but no one responded because they were not monitoring the freq.
Another BIFC comm unit arrived and Fred Buhr (Type I comm unit leader) has straightened things out.

OFFICER’S SIGNATURE

WITNESS’ SIGNATURE (If Applicable)
USDA MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
Forest Service (Reference FSH 5309.11)

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION
DUDT FIRE FATALITIES

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)
   LARRY TERRA

7. HOME ADDRESS (St. City, State, ZIP Code)
   PERRYVILLE

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)
    COLLECTION SERVICE OFFICIAL
    FIRE CREW SUPERVISOR

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW
    J. MONOISmith/ELDON ROSS

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED
   Date       Time
   6/19/90 10:30

16. REMARKS
   Larry is the Fire Crew Supervisor & a Fire Safety Coordinator. The crew is under contract
   with the Ariz State Dept/Division of Forestry. The crew arrived at Payson R.D. about 1930
   Monday 25th. They checked in with operations. At 1030 they were directly to go to base camp
   to bed down. They ate dinner at 2300-2400 and while enroute to base camp, a Park Ranger
   redirected the crew to the line at Bonita. The crew arrived at the Bonita Subdivision about 0100.
   They received instructions to park their vehicles heading out in event quick escape was necessary. La Tour
   instructed them to take their shelters out of their packs & put them on their hip. They had met up previously with La Tour at the
   Payson R.D. La Tour had worked with the crew on other fires. Shortly after, they were instructed to put their
   shelters back in the packs & tock up. Minutes later, about 1130 they was told to get in the vehicles
   & get out.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)
They drove for over an hour in the same direction they had come in. Arrived at the junction of the control road & Waker Moore's Canyon about 0230. Was instructed to cut line along the jeep trail. A dozer had not been through the area. Area was extremely hazardous, heavy fuels. They were instructed to build a 2' wide line on the right track. Later they were bumped up to where the powerline crossed the jeep trail. Instructions were to improve the powerline R/W toward the subdivision by clearing a 3' line.

They had two of their own power saws (Pro Mac 700's). Time is about 04-030. La Tour was in constant communication with D11, Superc, Ashby.

Though a dozer was building line up the jeep trail from the control road, they improved the line up to the subdivision, arriving there about 0500. Worked there until 09-1000. Left the subdivision d met with the Prescott H.5, where the jeep RD tied into the road around the subdivision. They were instructed to improve the dozer line moving down back where canyon 81 on the fire side.

Made contact with Scopa who had asked to use his radio. Expressed concern regarding the vegetation. Canary over the dozer line to Scopa & La Tour.

At approx 1100 the crew ran out of water. Ordered water through La Tour but none arrived in over 45 min. Took Fred Hill & left to get water & fuel from the vehicles on the control road.

Left his radio with Sandra Bachman who was to be in charge. Passed La Tour on the way down & noticed an ATV took the water up & dropped it off for them. They left the control road
Conditions because very dark & they recognized
it was not a good situation.

Met up with Navajo II who were
working below the Perryville crew. The
Navajo's had little or no radio comm. At
approx 12:15, they were about at the last
person on the crew & heard a crew
member yell "get out." Crew started
turning down & out. They continued
up the trail to the in. While their crew
heard wind like a locomotive & saw a
wall of flame on the side ridge. Continued
toward the crew. Didn't hear any radio
Comm. Three of the Perryville crew ran
down walk more. Passed them at top speed without saying
anything. Three more came running toward
them. They asked one why he was running
with a chainsaw. Took the chainsaw from
them & eventually carried it out.

Fire crowned & then dropped in front of
them with intense heat. 1004 orange
flame on all sides. Appeared there
was not enough time to deploy their shelter.

Hill had already started back. Decision
was made to run back. Met up with
N. Enriquex who was walking. Wall of
fire on east was advancing faster than
the front on the west. Both continued
running & caught up with Flippen. I soon got to
the control road.

At 1547 was notified by love that they were
all dead (Sandra, James & Joe).

Had sent two 2 person lookouts to check the
LEFT FOR WATER. THEY SCOUTED & RETURNED
ALL AIR TRAFFIC STOPPED AND IT WAS
SPRINKLING ABOUT 1330-1400. HEARD
EXPLOSIONS OVER THE RIDGE.
NO SAFETY ZONES WERE DESIGNATED.
ESCAPED ROUTES WERE UP OR DOWN THE
DOZER LINE.
THUNDER STORM CAME OUT OF NOWHERE AND
CREATED AN EXCEPTIONAL SITUATION.

INTERVIEW 7/7 @ 2:30 PM BY N. MONE SMITH

TERRA SAID THAT HIMSELF, BACHMAR, CHACON,
DENNEY, ELLIS, HARK, LUCQ, ENRIQUEZ, AND
HILL DID NOT TAKE THE STEP-TEST DURING 1990
BECAUSE THEY WERE CONCENTRATING ON TESTING
THE NEW PERSONNEL. THEY WERE CONDUCTING
DAILY EXERCISE FOR 1/2 - 1 HOUR INCLUDING
JOGGING, WIND SPRINTS, ROPE JUMPING,
BIKE & WEIGHTS.
## MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

**USDA Forest Service**

### NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

**Dude Fire Fatalities**

### NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

**Mark Tiffany**

### HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, Zip Code)

### EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

**Payson Engine 438 Crew Foreman**

### LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

**Incident Base Camp**

### NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

**Devil We Goons**

### OTHERS PRESENT

### STARTED (Date and Time)

- 6/30/90 1400

### ENDED (Date and Time)

- 6/30/90 1430

### REMARKS

- **6/26/90** - This interview was for the purpose of determining causes of the fire.
- **6/26/90** - The engine was stationed at the intersection of Wallace Canyon and the Control Road.
- **A spot fire was reported south of the control road, west of Wallace Canyon.** Winds were NE about 5 mph along the road.
- **1 PM** - A few light sprinkler notes.
- **2 PM** - Winds were calm.
- **2:30 PM** - Rapid wind shift to NW 30+ mph - the engine left.
- The scene 24 to 3 min later - fire was everywhere.
**USDA Forest Service**

**MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW**

(Reference FSH 5308.11)

1. **CASE NUMBER**

2. **NATURE OF INVESTIGATION**
   - Dude Fire Fatalities

3. **NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)**
   - Mark Tiffany

4. **SOCIAL SEC. NO.**

5. **DOB**

6. **SEX**

7. **HOME ADDRESS (ST, City, State, ZIP Code)**
   - Tyson Engine Crew

8. **DRIVER'S LIC. NO.**

9. **PHONE (H) (Area Code)**

10. **EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)**
   - TFD Model 7B

11. **PHONE (W) (Area Code)**

12. **LOCATION OF INTERVIEW**
   - Plans text

13. **NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW**
   - Pat Andrews

14. **OTHERS PRESENT**

15. **STARTED**
   - Date: 6/20/90
   - Time: pm

16. **REMARKS**
   - Mon 1300 6/25 - water tender met with crew on west line off 129 road.
   - 1700 - waiting for helitak
   - Supposed to go to Bonita for structure protection
   - 2100 - got there.
   - John Day - with water tender.
   - Shots reported major runs to the SE.
   - Runs up hill then switch to down canyon
   - Sat at the edge of the subdivision and watched the fire until 0300.
   - Spotting down slope.
   - Watched embers land and quickly grew to spot.
   - 0200-0300.
Watched it do that for about an hour.

The fire would spot. Make spot fires. Then the main fire would catch up to the spot.

Left at 0300.
Went to the Control Road to regroup.
Urban engines went in for structure protection. He was for forest protection. So went to the base of Walkmore Canyon to sit water for the burnout.

Got to base of Walkmore at 0400.

They were short on hose & nozzles. Got 600 ft of lineout. — to the power line.

The dozer went up the line.

Saw white/black/red clouds all morning around NE of estates — Burnout.

Spot over Control Road @ 1000 or 1100.

He came down — but another engine was sent to it and got it.

He saw what he thought was the burnout coming.

It looked nice. NE wind 5 mph.

The lead was moving SW — watched it come for 30-60 min.

Still thought it was the burnout.

1200 report of fire over the Control Road. Some confusion on the radio with the earlier spot over the road.

Pleasant valley 46 confirmed it was the main fire.

Calms — Dead Calms. At Control Road. Ridge line blew up.

Crews ran out. They picked up people. 50-60 mph blast 2½-3 min.

Navy’s crew — sprinkle 5 tons before.

Communication lost before blowup — impossible after.
# USDA MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

## NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

### DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

### NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

**LAM FLORES, BUTCH**

### HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, Zip Code)

**BRADFORD R.D., PRESCOTT NF.**

### EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

**Ops. Sect. Chief, Type II Team**

### LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

**13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW**

**JEREMI MONTGOMERY**

**ELDON ROSS**

### OTHERS PRESENT

**15. STARTED**

Date: 6/28

Time: 12:00

**16. REMARKS**

Worked together with Dundas during the first shift. Concentrated efforts on the Bonita area. Division E was from the control road northeast to approximately the beginning of the burnout. Division points were not well defined.

Everyone knew the conditions were critical. Erskine and Gill were monitoring the firing operations, Ashby had the crews and the state structural engines in Bonita.

The sequence of crews at about 1:00-1:15 was: ZigZag, Prescott H.S. (protecting the last house), Perryville, Navajo scouts, Alpine H.S. (to control road).

Turned responsibilities over to cook about 1330. Wasn't comfortable about the transition. However, the division supervisors were shadowing, would prefer not to transition in the middle of the shift in the future. Division supervisors were replaced by one.
Did not deal directly with the air attack or lead plane. Worked through Glen for any air operations.

Communication frequencies were very busy.

Just before returning to camp, checked where the fire had crossed the control road and found it was not passable.
There were four general questions that the team requested be addressed during the interview with Jeff. The first being what was his position and responsibility. Jeff stated that he was Group Supervisor for the Group of Division, with the responsibility for the protection of structures within the Boinia Creek Wildlife Study. Whitney's major assignment was to supervise a large burn-out operation being conducted along the west side of the development assigned to the burn-out operation was the Prescott Station 212095, Plumes, cruise shots and Flame and short crews. In addition there were several Type I Engine crews. Most of the time in the morning we spent fire proofing structures and supervising the burn-out operations. Between 1330 and 1400 Phil Bill took Whitney to the Southeastern portion of the Boinia Estates for him to pick-up his vehicle. At that time he noticed a spot fire on the East side of the Estates. He then attempted to drive out the road.
To the control road we encountered another spot fire blocking this access. He then returned to the northwest side of the estate and ordered the building of the safety zone.

The area of responsibility under which Whitney understood was "Group F," all within the Box To Creek Estates.

Another question was had he had contact with the Perryville crew prior to the deployment? His answer was he had had no radio contact with the Perryville crew because of the differences in radio frequencies being used by the overhead. The overhead was operating on the BIFC radio nets and the Perryville crew was operating on the state NIMS frequency.

During the work period that Whitney had been in Group F, no State Team Leader had been assigned to the Division where the Navajo Crew #2 or Perryville crews.
USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION
Dude Fire Fatalities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)
Jeffrey C. Whitney

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW
Fire Camp - Plains lake

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW
Pat Andrews

2. HOME ADDRESS (SL, City, State, ZIP Code)

14. OTHERS PRESENT
none

3. NATURE OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Occupation and Location)

4. OTHERS PRESENT
none

15. STARTED
6/28/90 2200

16. ENDED
2300

5. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

6. DOB

7. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

8. PHONE (M) (Area Code)

9. PHONE (H)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

11. PHONE (W)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

16. ENDED

17. REMARKS
Has worked on the District 80-83, Hot Shot Crew.
Knew typical fire on the rim, was surprised to see
the fire burning downslope at 1:30 on 6/26. Head fire
was running downslope.
Briefing done 6:30 6/26. @ 0700 fire was active, not crowning,
more touching.
Shadow + replace team @ 1300. Comfortable. Knew the people.
Incomforatable that there was no good anchor.
News had been on for 18-20 hours. 0700 back to camp,
Lemont - slow - good air support.
Ten - dozer - off to N/E. Spot over the line
30'. Dick Cook didn't assign a section of the line,
Flaming the Lemont.
The transaction was complete, but he stayed because
they needed help.
Everything was going well. Zigzag was doing the lighting.
Shot them off.
Started out, heard it cross the Control Road. Dvonk said, "I don't have a secure position."

Ashley (div. gr. Sup.) had mutual-aid communication. Latewood was there, but did not assert authority.

About 150 people secure.

5 frequencies - crew, command, mutual aid, maybe 25 radios among the 150 people.

For 45 minutes there was no air cover. - Read eyes in the sky.

Heard that the fire crossed the Control Road.

Went to get rig or east side of subdivision.

Saw a spot south of subdivision - not the one from the current.

5 min. to get rig - 5 min to come back.

While getting the rig, someone said "Can't get into subdivision."

Called Prescott - said get into safety zone.

Ordered movement to safety zone.

Thought the fire blew at the top - that the rest could go down.
2. Incident Objectives
### Incident Objectives

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<tr>
<th>Incident Name</th>
<th>Date Prepared</th>
<th>Time Prepared</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dude</td>
<td>6-25</td>
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#### Operational Period (Date/Time)
6-26-90 0600 - 1800

#### General Control Objectives for the Incident (Include Alternatives)

1. Suppress fire insuring maximum firefighter and Public safety.
2. Protect private land and structures at Bonita Creek, Whispering Pines and Verde Glen.
3. Protect timber resource on top of the rim at the bottom.
4. Protect T&I plants in riparian zones.
5. Hold fire south of FR 300 on top of rim.
6. Protect General Springs Cabin Historic Site north of FR 300. Notify host if evacuation necessary.
7. Minimize impacts to General Creek Hiking Trail north of FR 300.
8. Hold fire at lowest acreage possible to minimize visual quality scars on side of rim and along FR 300.
9. Avoid cultural resource sites during line construction and other suppression/support activities.

#### General/Safety Message

Extremely steep terrain; watch for falling rocks, numerous snags, watch for spot fires. Beware of rapid rates of spread.

#### Attachments (✓ if Attached)

- [X] Organization List (ICS 203)
- [X] Division Assignment Lists (ICS 204)
- [X] Communications Plan (ICS 205)
- [X] Medical Plan (ICS 206)
- [ ] Incident Map
- [ ] Traffic Plan
3. Fire Behavior Forecast
FIRE BEHAVIOR FORECAST NO. 1

NAME OF FIRE: DUDE PREDICTION FOR: SHIFT
FOREST: TONTO SHIFT DATE: 6/26/90

TIME AND DATE
FORECAST ISSUED: 6/26/90 @2200 SIGNED: P. Velasco

WEATHER SUMMARY:

See Attached 'Spot Fire Weather Forecast'

FIRE BEHAVIOR

GENERAL: Severe burning will continue to be present today. Heavy Brush. Heavy timber stands and steep topography. Fuel moistures are very low at this time. Fire will be active all night and pick up by as early as 0900.

SPECIFIC:

Top of Rim: Expect upslope runs to cause spotting. Be alert for spots across the control line.

West Side: Winds may actually be favorable for line construction and burning out.

East Side: This will be the critical side. Expect extreme fire behavior with long range spotting, torching and high rates of spread.

South Side: Also a very critical flank. Expect very active fire behavior. Predicted afternoon, erratic winds will escape, intense fire behavior. Watch for hot runs.

AIR OPERATIONS: Smoke will hamper operations. Thunder storms will produce turbulent flying conditions.

SAFETY: Extreme rates of spread (100 chains per hour), possible, and predicted high temperatures and dry thunderstorms.

Call for maximum alertness.
4. Health and Safety Message
Health and Safety Message

Incident: Dude Fire
Date: 4/25
Time: 2100

Major Hazards and Risks:

Mogollon Rim Fire - All hazards associated with a Rim Fire. Steep slopes, extreme fire behavior, high intensity fuels, possibility of lightning.

Narrative:

Study "watch out" situations and survival checklist below carefully, both have messages which can help in working the Dude Fire. Be especially aware of the following: 1. Rolling rocks and other materials on the line 2. Spott ing and other extreme fire behavior 3. Gusty shifting winds 4. Hazardous transportation conditions.

"Watch Out!" Situations

1. Fire not scouted and sized up.
2. In country not seen in daylight.
3. Safety zones and escape routes not identified.
4. Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior.
5. Uninformed on strategy, tactics and hazards.
6. Instructions and assignments not clear.
7. No communication link with crew members/supervisors.
8. Constructing line without safe anchor point.
9. Building fireline downhill with fire below.
10. Attempting frontal assault on fire.
11. Unburned fuel between you and the fire.
12. Cannot see main fire, not in contact with anyone who can.
13. On a hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below.
14. Weather is getting hotter and drier.
15. Wind increases and/or changes direction.
17. Terrain and fuels make escape to safety zones difficult.
18. Taking a nap near the fireline.

Your Safety Team

Safety Officer

Survival Checklist

- Fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first.
- Initiate all action based on current and expected fire behavior.
- Recognize current weather conditions and obtain forecasts.
- Ensure instructions are given and understood.
- Obtain current information on fire status.
- Remain in communication with crew members, your supervisor and adjoining forces.
- Determine safety zones and escape routes.
- Establish lookouts in potentially hazardous situations.
- Retain control at all times.
- Stay alert, keep calm, think clearly, act decisively.
5. Site Photographs
A view south along Walk Moore Canyon. The large ponderosa pine at the right is charred on the west side, but not the east.

A view north in Walk Moore Canyon approximately 14 chains from the Control Road FR 69. Nomex clothing is laid out at the location where fatality, J. Ellis, was found lowest in the Canyon.
A view north in Walk Moore Canyon at the accident site. Nomex clothing is laid out where victims were found. Shows deployed shelter location of J. Denney lower left, S. Bachman, center, and A. Contreras, center right side of trail.

A view north in Walk Moore Canyon at the accident site. Nomex clothing is laid out where victims were found with their shelters. Shows location of J. Chacon's deployed shelter and his hardhat.